Premises liability cases are based around liability for dangerous conditions that cause injury. An element that is always relevant in premises cases is the issue of knowledge: The defendant must have actual or implied knowledge of the dangerous condition. For businesses, an employee’s knowledge is imputed on the employer. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1961). The Defendant/Employer is deemed with knowledge when the employee causes the dangerous condition or is aware of the dangerous condition.

This premises liability case asked the First District Court of Appeal to certify conflict with decisions from the Fifth and Third DCAs. See Barbour v. Brinker Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Grayson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 576 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

In Whitlow, the dangerous condition was water that was dripping off a stretcher onto the floor while being pushed by a hospital employee. During litigation, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition because water was dripping while the employee pushed the stretcher. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the hospital employee actually knew that the stretcher was dripping water. The First DCA affirmed, and the Plaintiff sought for a certified conflict ruling. The Florida Supreme Court has authority to review DCA decisions where there is a certified conflict between DCAs.

The Barbour decision involved a restaurant patron stepping on a “roll of toilet paper with the roller mechanism inside the cardboard lying on the floor.” 801 So. 2d at 956. The Barbour court ruled that 1) the restaurant employees were responsible for and knew how to change the toilet paper, and 2) actual knowledge could be inferred based upon the employee’s responsibility. Accordingly, the Barbour court found that there was circumstantial evidence to imply knowledge.

In Grayson, the dangerous condition was a puddle of water on the pool deck of a cruise ship. The evidence showed that employees caused the water to splash while working a few minutes prior to the accident. There was also testimony that the employees constantly inspected the pool, and an employee was stationed on the pool deck at all times. Together, the evidence provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that the Defendant had knowledge of the dangerous condition.

The First DCA found no conflict with its prior decisions because there was not sufficient circumstantial evidence to charge knowledge on the defendant. Unlike the Barbour decision, there was no evidence of a duty to keep the floor dry or ensure that the stretcher was not dripping. Unlike the Grayson decision, there was no testimony that someone was inspecting the floor for water. There was no evidence to show that the Defendant’s employees had actual knowledge of the dripping water. Knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key component of premises cases. Knowledge may be shown by actual or implied knowledge. Speak to a Dutton Law Group attorney today to evaluate your premises case.